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Abstract 
Free school choice has often been argued to be a tide that lifts school quality 
through increased competition. This paper analyzes the underlying assumption 
that school quality is an important choice criterion for parents. Using a large and 
representative data set of over 15,000 Dutch primary school starters we estimate 
models of school demand that incorporate heterogeneity in school preferences. 
Our results show that traditional measures for school quality matter, but other 
characteristics, such as school denomination and educational philosophy, are more 
important predictors of choice. Preferences for these school characteristics are 
strongly heterogeneous across parents. 
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1.  Introduction 
Policies that aim to raise school quality, like the no child left behind act in the US, focus on 
increasing the freedom of school choice. The idea behind these policies is that schools will 
have to provide higher quality education if they have to compete for students with other 
schools. 
One key underlying assumption for school competition to raise the quality of 
education is that the quality of a school is an important choice criterion for parents. Parental 
preferences however are unlikely to be one-dimensional. Parents may also value other 
characteristics of schools such as the teaching philosophy, religious affiliation or geographical 
proximity. If parents have weak preferences for school quality relative to other school 
characteristics, quality competition between schools is likely to remain low, even when 
parents are given more opportunities to choose. In this case, free choice may stimulate schools 
to specialize by offering specific features instead of improving the quality of their program. 
Estimates of parental preferences for primary school quality (measured by test scores) are 
scarce1 and the relative importance of other school characteristics has mostly been neglected. 
This article provides an elaborate picture of parental primary school preferences by 
investigating heterogeneous preferences for school quality and a variety of additional school 
characteristics such as school denomination and teaching philosophy. The measures for 
school quality that we use are the assessment outcome of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education 
and school average test scores (CITO scores). Our study complements previous research by 
investigating to which extent school quality and these additional characteristics form 
preferences for schools and by studying how these preferences vary across parents.2  
1  Important estimates of parental preferences for school quality are provided by among others 
Burgess et al. (2014), Koning and van der Wiel (2013) Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2010) 
and Jacob and Lefgren (2007). 
2 The effects we identify are not necessarily caused by the quality indicators that we 
investigate, but could also be driven other unobserved quality attributes that strongly 
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We use a combination of administrative and survey data on over 15,000 Dutch parents 
of primary school students to estimate conditional and mixed logit models of school choice. 
The latter model allows estimates to vary across the population of choosers which is central to 
the identification of heterogeneity in preferences for school characteristics.  
The Dutch context is of particular interest since, in contrast to other countries that 
have introduced free school choice more recently, it provides a case where school choice has 
traditionally been unrestricted. The observed patterns in school choice can be assumed to 
represent a general equilibrium and behavior will not be driven by recent policy changes or 
other interventions. 
Our results firstly show that school quality matters: parents prefer schools with higher 
average student test scores and schools with a positive quality assessment of the Dutch 
Inspectorate of Education. We find heterogeneity in the response to the outcome of the 
Inspectorate’s assessment. Parents with higher education levels are more sensitive to the 
Inspectorate’s assessment than lower educated families. Similarly, schools with higher student 
achievements are on average more popular, but there is substantial variation in this preference 
among the group of lower educated people. About 32 percent of the lower educated families 
prefer schools with lower average achievement test scores over higher achieving schools. 
There are two potential explanations for these findings: (1) parents are unaware of quality 
differences at the school level or (2) they put a low weight on characteristics related to school 
quality when choosing a school.3  
correlate. We therefore aim to investigate whether they are consistent with observable quality 
indicators. 
3 It is important to keep in mind that the results are subject to reverse causality. The school 
average test scores and the Inspectorates assessment themselves could also be affected by the 
type of socio-economic subgroups that select into specific schools. In addition to this, the 
difference in preferences between higher and lower educated families may also be caused by 
the correlation of academic characteristics with school attributes that are unobservable. 
Another potential problem may be geographical (or neighborhood) segregation. Higher 
educated parents may be more likely to move into neighborhoods with higher quality schools.   
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Secondly, our results show that the schools’ denomination and the practice of an 
alternative teaching philosophy are important school characteristics that matter for choice. 
Parental preferences are also heterogeneous with regard to these other school characteristics 
such as whether a school is public, Catholic, Islamic, is dedicated to Montessori education or 
follows the educational philosophy of Rudolph Steiner. Even within specified socio-economic 
subgroups of the population, parents have varying preferences for particular school attributes. 
While some parents are willing to accept long daily travel distances to a school with a 
particular specialized profile, other parents avoid this school although it is in their immediate 
vicinity. Examples of these specialized schools are Islamic schools, which are very unpopular 
for the largest part of the population but very attractive to about 10 percent of the population. 
We further show that parents prefer schools that match their own religious beliefs. This effect 
is particularly strong for Islamic parents.  
When looking at preferences for school instruction styles we find that non-mainstream 
schools with an alternative teaching philosophy are on average less popular, but some higher 
educated parents strongly prefer these schools. Our estimates show that 26 percent of the 
higher educated parents prefer schools with alternative teaching concepts over mainstream 
education and are willing to accept a three to four times longer daily traveling distance to 
attend such a school. 
Our findings with respect to the preferences for school quality are in line with 
previous research that has shown that parents with a lower socio-economic background put 
lower weights on observable school quality indicators. Hastings et al. (2010) use data from 
Charlotte, North Carolina to show that black and lower income families have weaker 
preferences for primary and secondary schools with higher student achievements. The authors 
conclude that lower quality schools have weak incentives to improve because they attract 
parents that care less about quality. The authors further argue that high quality schools 
4 
 
perceive more competitive pressure, because the higher SES parents that choose these schools 
are more sensitive to differences in average student achievements.  
Our findings are consistent with the recent work of Burgess et al. (2014) who show 
that parents in England value academic performance and proximity. Our results confirm their 
finding that socio-economically advantaged parents have stronger preferences for academic 
performance measured by test scores. 
This article is also related to research that has focused on estimating parental 
preferences for secondary schools. Koning and van der Wiel (2013) investigate how parents 
in the Netherlands react to publicly available quality information about secondary schools.4 
They show that newspaper published school rankings significantly predict future student 
enrolment: negative school quality scores decrease the number of enrolments and positive 
scores increase the number of students choosing that school. The largest effect was found in 
response to scores about the highest secondary school track (VWO). However, the size of the 
estimates suggests that even if parents are well informed, the effect of published quality 
indicators is generally small compared to the impact of other characteristics such as the 
overall reputation of a school track or the distance from home to school. 
We show that quality indicators such as school average achievement test scores and 
the online published assessment outcome of the Inspectorate of Education matter for primary 
school choice. Besides school quality, the school’s denomination, teaching concept and 
proximity are important determinants for primary school choice. Preferences are strongly 
heterogeneous across parents. 
4 Ruijs and Oosterbeek (2012) also investigate secondary school choice behavior in the city of 
Amsterdam and conclude that proximity to schools and peers are more important 
determinants of school choice than quality. 
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on the Dutch education system. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 describes 
our empirical strategy. Section 5 shows the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 2. The Dutch education system  
The Netherlands have a longstanding tradition in free school choice. Since 1917, parents can 
freely choose between state funded private and public schools. In contrast to other countries 
where free school choice policies are introduced more recently, the Netherlands provide a 
case to study school choice behavior that can be assumed to be closer to a “steady-state”. The 
results presented in this article can therefore be interpreted as evidence about how parental 
school choice preferences are shaped in a stable system without major policy discontinuities. 
This can be of particular interest for policy makers who are interested in the persistence of 
observed short run effects of free choice. 
Dutch parents can in theory choose among all schools in the Netherlands. There are no 
school catchment areas or choice restricting school districts. School tuition fees are small or 
non-existent and therefore do not restrict school choice. The most obvious costs that parents 
face when choosing a more distant school are the opportunity costs of time. Both parents and 
their children will spend more time on traveling if they choose a more distant school since the 
school and the classmates of their children will be located farther away. Due to the high 
population density in the Netherlands, a number of schools is usually within walking or 
cycling distance.5   
Dutch parents can choose among schools with a variety of different religious 
affiliations and diverse educational concepts that fit their personal values best. Besides public 
schools (“openbare scholen”) there are schools with denominations like Catholic, Hindu, 
5 The population density is about 487 people per square kilometer (if only the land area is 
being counted). 
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Islamic, and Protestant schools. Schools which focus on a specific pedagogical concept are 
the “Brede school”, “Dalton school”, “Freinetonderwijs”, “Iederwijs”, “Jenaplan”, 
“Montessori” and “Vrije scholen”. The three most prevalent schools types that are usually 
within reach are Catholic, Protestant and public schools. 
 All school types are publicly funded, proportional to their student numbers. Schools 
that serve students from a more disadvantaged parental background receive some additional 
funding. 
Oversubscriptions are sometimes a problem in larger cities in the western part of the 
country and are usually solved with admission lotteries. In some urban areas of the 
Netherlands, especially Amsterdam and Utrecht, student numbers are rapidly growing and 
white parents with a higher socio-economics background seem to prefer schools with a high 
fraction of parents with a similar background. Therefore a number of “white” schools in these 
areas are heavily oversubscribed. In the most southern province Limburg, where the data for 
this article were collected, there is little segregation. The area faced a decline in the number of 
children in recent years. Therefore, oversubscriptions and capacity constraints do not play a 
role for choice considerations. 
 
2.1 Primary education 
Primary education in the Netherlands starts at the age of four and is compulsory from the age 
of 5. Parents in the region South Limburg apply directly at the schools where they would like 
to enroll their child. According to Dutch law, all schools (with a few exceptions) are obliged 
to accept all children that wish to enroll unless applications exceed capacity constraints. In the 
region that we analyze most children are accepted at the first school they apply.6 A large share 
6 In the latest survey which was sent out to the parents, the following question was included in 
a section about the school which the child is attending: “Was this school your first choice?”. 
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of the schools in the Netherlands has a religious affiliation. For these schools, the same public 
finding rules apply as for public schools. In principle these schools could refuse children that 
do not practice their religious principles, but schools are required to behave consistently in 
this respect. That means that once one child is accepted that does not meet these norms, the 
norm cannot be applied anymore. There are schools in other regions in the Netherlands that 
have access restrictions for these reasons, but in the region we analyze there are no schools 
that apply these specific norms.   
Primary education in the Netherlands lasts for eight years, where the first two grades 
consist mostly of preparatory activities and can be compared to kindergarten in the US. At the 
end of grade eight, a nationwide standardized central exam is taken – the so-called CITO test. 
This test is externally developed and objectively marked by the CITO institute, a non-profit 
organization, which is independent from the schools. So the test is not assessed by teachers of 
a particular school themselves. The conduction of the test takes place at the same time for all 
schools and lasts for several school days. The CITO test covers three main subjects: language, 
math and science. The outcome of the CITO test together with the teacher’s recommendation 
determines the secondary school track. There are three different types of secondary education 
tracks that vary in their degree of difficulty and educational focus. Only the highest track 
(VWO) permits access to studies at the University level. For the purpose of this paper use the 
school average performance of students in grade 8 to predict the choice outcomes of children 
that just entered in grade 1. Therefore CITO scores are likely to contain latent lagged 
measures of school quality of the past eight years. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the end of primary school student achievement tests 
and the recommended thresholds for secondary school tracking. The figure shows that the 
93.8 percent of the parents state that this is the case. This provides evidence that 
oversubscriptions are not a serious problem in this part of the Netherlands. 
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variation in the average achievement test scores across schools is substantial.7 If a school is to 
the right of the solid vertical line, the average student at this school goes to the highest 
secondary school track. The average achievement test score of a school is generally not 
publicly known, but some schools publish their score on their websites for marketing reasons. 
 
2.2 Inspectorate of Education 
In order to maintain certain standards at the school level, the educational quality is monitored 
by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education which assesses schools through regular visitations and 
by evaluating student achievements. The Inspectorate’s assessment consists of class 
observations, and meetings with pupils, parents, teachers and the school management team. In 
addition, the Inspectorate investigates whether the school is able to perform a reliable self-
evaluation and whether the school complies with statutory rules and regulations. One 
additional factor in the process of evaluation is the schools’ average achievement test score 
(CITO score).8 There are three final outcomes of these quality assessments: “trusted”, “weak” 
or “unsatisfactory”. About five percent of the primary schools receive the label “weak” and 
less than 1 percent are “unsatisfactory”.  The quality assessment of the Inspectorate is 
published online and parents can look up the rating of a specific school or compare the 
schools in the neighborhood. If schools continue to provide unsatisfactory quality or do not 
comply with the Inspectorate, they can be sanctioned by the Minister of Education. The most 
extreme measure is cutting off a school’s funding. 
 
3.  Data 
7 One interesting question from an economic perspective is why these differences in school 
quality maintain in a system of free choice. Market forces should lead to an equilibrium where 
all schools converge to a certain quality level. A potential answer could lie in the 
heterogeneity of preferences. 
8 About 90 percent of all schools use the “CITO” test for student assessment.  
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The school choice data analyzed in this article were collected by the Maastricht University 
research project Moelejaan in the southern part of the Dutch province Limburg. South 
Limburg is an urbanized area of 661 square kilometers and a population of about 620,000. It 
is surrounded by Belgium and Germany and only the north is connected to the rest of the 
Netherlands. 
The data we use are a combination of administrative student data from schools and 
survey data from a questionnaire among the parents at these schools. 200 primary schools in 
this area participated in the study and provided student level data. This is about 97 percent of 
the primary schools in the region South Limburg. The data consist of 16,852 children from 
three different cohorts that started school in 2007, 2008 and 2009. For the analysis, 1,065 
children are dropped from the sample due to missing or non-existent home addresses. 13 
schools are excluded because of missing end of primary school achievement test scores 
(CITO scores).9 The final sample consists of 15,000 students from 183 schools. For about 64 
percent of these children we have information about the education level of the parents from 
survey data, which we use for some parts of our analysis. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for five different school types. The table gives a 
first impression of how parents at various schools differ in terms of observables. Column (5) 
shows that schools with an alternative teaching concept attract particular students. Students at 
these schools travel a substantially longer distance from home to school and have on average 
higher educated parents. The performance of these schools is relatively weak in terms of 
student achievement and the schools are also more likely to be assessed as “weak” by the 
Inspectorate.  
The table also shows the average distance rank of the students that attend a particular 
school type. The average distance rank of all schools is 2.66, which means that students on 
9 These schools did not participate in the CITO test. They conducted a non-comparable end of 
primary education achievement tests. 
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average have 1.66 school options that are closer to their home location, but which they do not 
choose to attend. For schools with an alternative teaching concept, the average student-school 
distance rank is 5.78. The table shows that more specialized schools attract students which 
live farther away (i.e. that have more other schools closer to their homes). 
Table 2 shows that there are many schools in the direct vicinity of the students’ 
homes. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the Euclidian distance to the chosen school. The 
median distance to the chosen school is .525 kilometers. 90 percent of the parents choose a 
school that is within a 1.785 kilometer radius from home, and few parents choose schools 
located far away from their home. 
 
4. Empirical strategy  
In order to investigate how parents choose between different primary schools we apply two 
different discrete choice models: the conditional logit and the mixed logit model. In the 
following we will briefly discuss the intuition and limitations of both estimation techniques. 
We use both the conditional and mixed logit models to allow a direct comparison 
between the different methods. Our benchmark model in the analysis is the mixed logit 
model. This model is less restrictive than the conditional logit model regarding the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption and crucial to identify heterogeneity 
in preferences without using one specific variable that represents the dimension of 
heterogeneity. The downside of the mixed logit model is that its lack of a closed form solution 
creates computational limitations. The mixed logit further requires making an appropriate 
assumption about the mixing distribution of the random variables. In the following we discuss 
the functional form of both models in more detail. 
 
4.1 The conditional logit model 
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The conditional choice model was developed by McFadden (1973) and first applied to the 
context of school choice by Glazerman (1998). Intuitively, the conditional logit model 
compares the characteristics of the chosen school with the characteristics of all schools which 
are not chosen, using student fixed effects. 
In this model, the parents of each child i face the decision to choose between j 
different schools. Every school is associated with a certain amount of individual specific 
utility 𝑈𝑖𝑗. The model assumes that utility Uij can be described as a linear function of a child 
specific component, a school specific component 𝑋𝑗, a school-child specific component 𝑍𝑖𝑗 
and a non-systematic random component ε𝑖𝑗 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 = 𝑊𝑖 +  𝑋𝑗 +  𝑍𝑖𝑗 + ε𝑖𝑗  .    (1) 
 
Examples of Wi are individual specific characteristics like gender, age or ability.  𝑋𝑗 
are school characteristics that are common to the population of school choosers. Examples of 
𝑋𝑗 are the average test results of a school, the assessment of the Inspectorate or the 
denomination of a school. The characteristics 𝑍𝑖𝑗 are school-student specific and represent an 
interaction between child and school attributes. An example of 𝑍𝑖𝑗 that we include in our 
model is the distance between the parents’ home and the school. 
The utility that the parents of child i  obtain from choosing school alternative j can be 
written in a linear form as: 
 
𝑈𝑖𝑗�𝑋𝑗 ,𝑍𝑖𝑗� = β1𝑊𝑖 + β2𝑋𝑗 +  β3𝑍𝑖𝑗 + ε𝑖𝑗    (2) 
 
Since we estimate preferences for schools within individuals we cannot identify β1. In 
our estimation, all individual characteristics that do not vary over school alternatives are  
12 
 
collinear with the individual fixed effect and therefore excluded from the model. The 
parameters 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are the focus of our interest, since they determine how differences in the 
attributes translate into utility differences. We assume that parents choose the school that 
provides them with the highest level of utility. The individual specific error terms are assumed 
to be random, independently-distributed variables with an extreme value distribution (the 
Gumbel distribution). 
We do not directly observe the utility level 𝑈𝑖𝑗, but use the observed outcomes of the 
choice process which are revealed to us in the data. If the parents of a child choose school J, it 
is revealed to us that 𝑈𝑖𝐽 >  𝑈𝑖𝑗−𝐽, i.e. that the utility level of the chosen school must have 
been larger than the utility of any other school in the choice set. The observed outcome 
variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗 is binary and takes on the value 1 if the school is chosen and zero otherwise. 
Using the observed outcomes of school choice we can estimate how differences in 𝑋𝑗 and 𝑍𝑖𝑗, 
which vary over different school options, relate to the probability that one given school has 
the highest amount of utility of all schools in the choice set. 
Wi, the individual specific characteristics do not vary over different choice 
alternatives. When estimating the model, all individual characteristics are invariant and fully 
collinear with the included individual fixed effects. Therefore Wi do not affect the choice 
probability. The resulting conditional logit model analyzes within person differences in 
preferences for schools. At first glance this appears unattractive since one of the main 
research questions of this article is how preferences for certain school characteristics vary 
across different socio-economic subgroups. In the conditional logit framework, estimating 
heterogeneity with respect to individual characteristics can be elicited by (1) estimating the 
model for subsamples of the population separately, or (2) including interaction terms between 
individual characteristics and school specific attributes. 
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One practical problem with the conditional logit estimation is the assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA).10 The IIA property assumes that the probability 
of choosing a particular alternative does not depend on the characteristics of other 
alternatives. Mixed logit models do not rely on this assumption. 
 
4.2 The mixed logit model 
The mixed logit model allows estimating the mean preference for a school attribute and the 
standard deviation of the mean preference coefficient. This appears particularly attractive for 
our research question since it allows a more direct estimation of heterogeneous preferences 
for certain school characteristics. The main advantage relative to the conditional logit model 
is that we do not need to specify the dimension in which a preference is heterogeneous. Using 
the mean and standard deviation, we can directly infer which share of the population has 
particular preferences for a specific school characteristic. 
The mixed logit is also a convenient solution for avoiding the IIA property of the 
conditional logit. The mixed logit or random parameter logit that we apply was developed by 
Train (2009) and allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution patterns, and 
correlation in unobserved factors. The mixed logit model works very similarly to the 
conditional logit model, but does not only estimate one point estimator that represents the 
mean preference of the population. Instead, the model assumes that coefficients βi vary over 
the population and are drawn from a normal or lognormal distribution. The mixed logit model 
can be represented in the following way in a random utility framework: 
10 To illustrate the importance of this, suppose parents have the choice between Catholic 
school A, Catholic school B and Protestant school C. The IIA assumption is that parents who 
have initially chosen school A would be equally likely to switch to school B and C if their 
chosen school A is closed and everything else including all school characteristics is held 
constant. One can expect that the IIA assumption does not hold in this school choice context 
since we would think that parents who have initially chosen for a Catholic school will be 
more likely to choose a school that is also Catholic. 
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 𝑈𝑖𝑗 = β𝑖′𝑋𝑖𝑗 +  η𝑖𝑗 +   ε𝑖𝑗   .      (3) 
 
The utility level the individual i obtains from choosing school alternative j is described 
as a function of 𝑋𝑖𝑗 which is a vector of school and/or child specific characteristics, the 
random parameter 𝜂𝑖𝑗 and the “regular” error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗. 𝜀𝑖𝑗 has a mean zero and is independent 
and identically distributed over alternatives.11 It is unrelated to 𝜂𝑖𝑗, the parameters in the 
vector βi. The density function of η is given as f(η| 𝛽) and depends on the parameters of the 
model. Following Train (2009), the estimated mixed logit probability is a weighted average of 
the logit equation, but evaluated at different values of β, with the weights given by the density f(η| 𝛽). For a given fixed β the probability of choosing alternative k, which inherits the 
highest utility out of J different options is: 
 
𝐿𝑖𝑘(𝛽𝑖) =  exp�𝑥𝛽𝑖′𝑋𝑖𝑘�exp (∑  βi′Xijj  )       .   (4) 
 
Since β is not fixed we have to integrate 𝐿𝑖𝑘(𝛽𝑖) over all possible variables of 𝛽𝑖. For 
this, we need the mixing distribution 𝑓(β). The mixed logit probability is then given as: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑘 = ∫ � exp�𝑥𝛽𝑖′𝑋𝑖𝑘�exp (∑  βi′Xijj  ) �𝑓(β)𝑑β   (5) 
 
11 Further, it is assumed to be not (auto) correlated and to have the same mean and same 
variance (homoskedastic).   
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Equation (5) does not have a closed form solution and the probability 𝑃𝑖𝑘 can be 
estimated using simulated maximum likelihood.12 
 
4.3 Accounting for school composition 
For the identification of parental preferences for school characteristics it is important to keep 
in mind that other school characteristics that correlate with our measures of school quality 
might be confounding factors. One obvious candidate for such a characteristic could be the 
fraction of peers with a similar socio-economic background at a given school. However, 
including the percentage of peers at a given school as an additional school characteristic 
introduces potentially severe endogeneity problems that prohibit a direct interpretation of peer 
preference estimates.13 One additional empirical challenge for the identification is that 
achievement tests are likely to reflect school quality but might also be based on a priori 
differences between children. For instance, children might sort into schools based on their 
socio-economic background.14  
 
5.  Results 
12 For the simulated maximum likelihood estimation one needs to generate random draws 
from 𝑓(𝛽). For every individual we use 50 draws of 𝛽. Our obtained results were not 
sensitive to an increase in the number of draws that we use. 
13 In a robustness analysis, we include the lagged fraction of peers with a similar education 
level (that have chosen the same school) as an additional school attribute to test to which 
degree peer preferences matter. These analyses show that the results remain robust to the 
inclusion of lagged peer characteristics. Due to the inherent endogeneity of this approach that 
complicates the interpretation of the obtained estimates we do not report these models in this 
article. 
14 We have also tested the robustness of our estimates using important parental background 
characteristics available in the data (education level and household income). We run 
regressions of the raw CITO score on parental characteristics and used the predicted scores of 
these regressions as a measure of socio-economic background adjusted CITO scores. The 
adjusted measure of school quality takes into account school level differences in the education 
level of the parents and the household income of parents. The point estimates of the adjusted 
CITO are marginally smaller, but this difference is not statistically significant. 
16 
 
                                                          
We analyze the preference for distance in section 5.1 and the preference for school quality in 
section 5.2. Section 5.3 analyzes the heterogeneity of preferences with respect to these 
indicators and section 5.4 investigates to what extent school popularity varies between socio-
economic groups. Section 5.5 and section 5.6 respectively analyze the importance of school 
denomination and alternative educational concepts.  
 
5.1  Preferences for distance 
Table 3 shows the estimates we obtain from the conditional logit estimation. The displayed 
coefficients represent the raw coefficients. Coefficients significantly larger than zero represent 
a characteristic that is related to an increase in the probability of choice and coefficients 
significantly lower than zero mean that this school characteristic is unpopular or unattractive 
among the population of choosers. The table shows that increased distance to a school option 
is negatively related to the probability of choice. Parents appear to have a strong preference 
for choosing a school close to their home location. 
Figure 3 shows how the probability of choosing a school relates to the distance of a 
school option and investigates whether this effect is linear. The graph is based on a 
conditional logit estimation that includes one dummy variable for every 100 meter unit of 
distance between home and school. The omitted category is having a school option within 100 
meters from home. The vertical axis displays the size of the coefficients and their 95 percent 
confidence intervals. As the distance between the home address and the school increases, the 
likelihood of choice decreases in a slightly convex trend. The difference between 0 and 1 
kilometer reduces the probability of choice more than the difference between 3 and 4 
kilometers. The marginal costs of traveling distance decrease slightly with increased distance. 
 
5.2  Preferences for school quality 
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The regressions in table 3 also include two measures for school quality: the outcome of the 
assessment of the Inspectorate, which is published online and the three year school average 
achievement test score (CITO score), which is not available for all schools. A negative 
assessment by the Inspectorate of Education is negatively related to the choice probability. 
Higher average student achievement test scores relate positively to the choice probabilities. 
These findings support the hypothesis that parents value these two measures of school quality 
when choosing among the different schools. In relation to the strong effect of distance, the 
preference for school quality seems to be rather weak. According to the estimated model, a 
school with a “trusted” rather than “weak” assessment outcome increases the willingness to 
travel farther by 190 meters.15 The inclusion of quality indicators does not attenuate the point 
estimates for distance. This shows that parents’ preferences for distance appear to be 
uncorrelated with academic quality (as measured by the CITO score or Inspection outcome).  
The estimates that we obtain from estimating the mixed logit models in table 4 show 
similar results. In table 4 we report the mean of the logit estimator and the standard deviation 
of the respective random parameter. The model shows that there is significant variation in the 
distance parameter, which suggests that some subgroups of the population are more sensitive 
to an increase in traveling distance than others.  
In both types of models, the size of the “weak assessment” coefficient is smaller when 
the standardized achievement test score is included. This collinearity between the two quality 
indicators is due to the construction of the Inspectorate’s assessment, which is partly built on 
the achievement test score (CITO). 
We also investigate whether the results may to some extent be driven by selective 
response to the survey. Table A1 shows which variables are correlated to survey response.  
15 The implied willingness to travel can be obtained by dividing the ‘Weak’ assessment 
coefficient by the distance coefficient in table 3. Differently framed example: Parents prefer 
school A with a CITO average of 530 over school B with a CITO average of 540 that is 100m 
farther away than school A. 
18 
 
                                                          
Responders are on average more likely to live closer to the chosen school, less likely to attend 
a school with a “weak” inspectorate assessment and more likely be come from a school with a 
higher CITO score. Table A2 shows how our point estimates differ between the full and the 
questionnaire sample. The point estimates are somewhat larger in the questionnaire sample, 
but they do not differ in a qualitative sense. In order to look at how preferences differ between 
socio-economic subgroups we are restricted to use the questionnaire since we do not have 
information about the parental education level for the rest of the sample.   
 
5.3  Heterogeneity across socio-economic subgroups  
We now turn to the question whether preferences for school quality are heterogeneous among 
parents with a different educational background. In order to investigate heterogeneity, we split 
the sample based on the highest obtained educational degree of the father of the child.16 Table 
5 shows estimates obtained from the conditional logit estimation for the three different 
subgroups. The estimates indicate that preferences for school quality vary substantially across 
groups. Higher educated families have stronger preferences for school average achievement 
test scores (CITO) when compared to middle and lower educated families. These last two 
groups do not significantly differ in their “taste” for high student achievements.  
The interpretation of these coefficients requires some caution. What appears to be a 
difference in preferences could also be a result of asymmetric information about school 
quality. The achievement test (CITO) scores may not be known to the public as only some 
schools publish them on their websites. Lower educated families may in general have less 
information about school quality or face larger information costs. Besides that, schools with 
16 The group “higher educated” refers to families where the father holds a degree from higher 
tertiary education: professional bachelor education (HBO) or university. The middle educated 
group refers to a degree from high secondary education (VWO) as the highest obtained degree 
of the father and the “lower educated group” represents families where the father holds a 
lower secondary or tertiary education level (HAVO/(V)MBO) or no educational degree. 
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lower average student achievements may be more likely to be located in neighborhoods with 
more people from a lower socio-economic background. Our findings therefore do not 
necessarily have a causal interpretation. 
Table 5 further shows that a “weak” outcome of the Inspectorate’s assessment is 
negatively related to the probability to choose the school. This effect varies across the three 
subgroups. Preferences for avoiding “weak” schools increase with the education level of the 
father. Holding everything else constant, higher educated parents would be willing to accept a 
375 meters longer way to school if they thereby could avoid sending their child to a “weak” 
labeled school. For lower educated families the respective distance is only 127 meters.17  
The preferences for school distance appear to be homogeneous across subgroups. In 
the estimates that represent the preferences for school proximity (distance to school), we 
observe only minor differences.18  
The results we obtain from the mixed logit models in table 6 give similar results with 
respect to the heterogeneity of preferences for school quality across families with different 
education levels. The benefit of the mixed logit model is that it allows us to investigate 
whether preferences are homogeneous within the specified educational subgroups. Table 6 
shows that there is substantial variation in the preference for “weak” schools among the group 
of lower educated. About 14 percent of the lower educated appear to prefer weak schools over 
non-weak schools.19  
This finding suggests that a substantial fraction of this subgroup either does not know 
about the online published Inspectorate’s assessment or that they do not care about what the 
Inspectorate considers poor educational quality. Yet another explanation could be that this 
17 The implied willingness to travel can be obtained by dividing the ‘Weak’ assessment 
coefficient by the distance coefficient in table 5. 
18 These differences are small, but significantly different across the three socio-economic 
subgroups. 
19 This percentage for a given variable X can be obtained by applying the formula: 1 −
Ω (β𝑥� / 𝑆𝐷𝑥� ); where Ω describes the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
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subgroup puts more weight on other school characteristics that negatively correlate with the 
Inspectorate’s assessment. One obvious candidate for such a characteristic would be the 
fraction of peers with a similar socio-economic background at a given school. Including the 
percentage of peers at a given school as an additional school characteristic introduces 
potentially severe endogeneity problems and the interpretation of peer preference estimates is 
not straightforward. 
Figure 4 displays the relationship between school popularity and school average 
student achievements in a different way. Controlling for distance to the school, we estimate a 
conditional logit model with a specific dummy variable for each school. The size of the 
estimated dummy coefficients can be interpreted as its relative popularity relative to other 
schools given their geographical characteristics. Figure 4 plots the coefficient size of these 
school dummies against the achievement test (CITO) score of the respective school. The 
vertical axis represents the size of the school dummies from a conditional logit model. The 
horizontal axis displays the school average CITO score of the respective school. The slope of 
the fitted values line is positive and significantly different from zero, which means that the 
school’s “attractiveness” relates positively to the average student achievements of the school. 
However, it is apparent from the graph that student achievements alone are rather weak or 
noisy predictors of school popularity. 
 
5.4 Consistency of school popularity across socioeconomic subgroups 
In the following we investigate whether different subgroups of the population consider a 
given school similarly attractive. We estimate a conditional logit model that includes distance 
to school and one dummy for each school in our data set. We estimate this model for three 
educational subgroups separately. These groups are constructed based on the highest obtained 
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degree of the father.20 The estimation output of this model produces 181 school fixed effects 
for each of the three educational subgroups. Each of these fixed effects yields a point estimate 
that represents the relative attractiveness in terms of revealed parental preferences. 
The attractiveness of a given school in one socio-economic subgroup can now be 
compared to the revealed preference for this school in a different subgroup by looking at the 
correlation of the schools’ fixed effects between two different groups. Figure 5 shows the 
consistency of school popularity across educational subgroups. Figure 5a displays the size of 
the school “attractiveness” dummy for the higher educated on the vertical axis and the size of 
the same school dummy for middle educated on the horizontal axis. With fully homogeneous 
preferences for schools the slope of fitted values should be identical to a 45 degree line. The 
slope of the fitted value line is .93 and not statistically different from one. This correlation 
suggests that high and middle educated parents find the same schools attractive and have very 
similar revealed preferences.  In contrast to that, the correlation in preferences of higher and 
lower educated families is much less consistent (Figure 5b). The correlation of revealed 
school attractiveness dummies is only .41 and statistically different from one. In figure 5c, 
where we compare the revealed preferences of middle and lower educated parents, the slope 
of the fitted value line is only .36, and statistically significantly different from one. This 
comparison between middle and lower educated parents shows that preferences for schools 
are remarkably different between these two groups. 
 
5.5  Preferences for school’s denomination 
We now investigate whether a school’s religious affiliation and educational concept matter for 
parental choice behavior. The mixed logit models in table 7 shows our most complete model 
of school choice. As in the previous regressions we include distance and two indicators for 
20 We split the sample into higher, middle and lower educated families. Using the education 
level of the mother provides qualitatively very similar results. 
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school quality. In addition to that, we also include three dummies for Public, Protestant and 
Islamic schools. The omitted reference category is Catholic schools. 
 Column (1) in table 7 shows that public schools appear on average equally attractive 
as Catholic schools, but there is substantial variation in the preference parameter. About half 
of the population prefers one of the two types. Looking at the group of middle educated 
parents we see that about 40 percent prefer Catholic over public schools. Protestant schools 
have on average a lower probability of being chosen than Catholic schools for higher and 
middle educated parents. About 15 percent of the higher educated parents prefer Protestant 
schools over Catholic schools. About 20 percent of the middle educated prefer Protestant 
schools over Catholic schools. 
The one Islamic school in our dataset is on average very unpopular for most parents, 
but this preference varies substantially over the population as revealed by the estimate of the 
standard deviation. About 10 percent of the parents have orthogonal preferences and find the 
Islamic school attractive. 
Since the survey data we are using also contain a question on the religious affiliation 
of the parents, we can test whether preferences for the religious denomination of the school 
depend on the parents’ own denomination. In table 8 we show how preferences for school 
denomination differ by the religion of parents. Column (1) shows that parents who indicated 
that they are not religious prefer public schools over Catholic and other religious schools. As 
expected, column (2) shows that Catholic parents prefer Catholic schools for their children. 
Column (3) shows that Islamic parents have particularly strong preferences for sending their 
children to an Islamic school. For this group, preferences are not only strong, but also quite 
heterogeneous. The majority of Islamic parents seem to strongly prefer Islamic schools while 
others want to avoid these schools. Taken together the evidence presented in table 8 shows 
that parents seem to prefer school that match their own religious beliefs. 
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 5.6  Preferences for alternative educational concepts 
The regressions in table 7 also include a dummy that specifies whether the school is devoted 
to an alternative teaching concept. Schools that belong to the “alternative teaching concept” 
category are Montessori, Jenaplan and Vrije schools. These schools usually grant their 
students a larger degree of individual freedom during the learning process and put more focus 
on fine arts, cultural, and artistic education. The reference group in the regressions is schools 
with a mainstream educational concept. The mean preference shows that schools with an 
alternative teaching philosophy are generally less popular. However, there is substantial 
variation in the preference for these schools. About 26 percent of the higher educated parents 
prefer these schools over mainstream schools. Middle and lower educated families seem to 
largely avoid these schools. 
An important point is that the inclusion of variables for different denomination types 
and an alternative teaching concept does not systematically alter the preference estimates for 
achievement test scores and the Inspectorate’s assessment. This supports that parental 
preferences for these special school characteristics are not captured by the available 
traditional measures of school quality. 
Schools with higher average student attainments and better quality assessments have a 
higher probability of being chosen, but parental preferences for certain denomination types 
and an alternative teaching concept are heterogeneous and particularly strong in some 
subgroups of the population.21  
 
6. Conclusion 
21 For CITO scores there is substantial variation in the preference among the group of lower 
educated people. About 32 percent of the lower educated families prefer lower CITO score 
schools over higher CITO score schools. 
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This article investigates which school characteristics matter for parental primary school 
choice in the well-established system of free school choice in the Netherlands. We find that 
school quality (measured by school average test scores) predicts school choice. Publicly 
available information on school assessments seems to influence choice behavior, particularly 
of higher educated families. However this “taste for quality” is dominated by the strong 
preference for schools that are close to the homes of the parents. Our findings confirm 
evidence from the US, which shows that lower educated parents appear to have weaker 
preferences for school quality.  
Moreover, our findings show that parents have strong preferences for a schools’ 
religious affiliation and the educational philosophy that is being applied at a school. Specific 
subgroups of the population have orthogonal preferences for a given school attribute. Parental 
choice preferences regarding these specialized schools with particular educational concepts 
have previously not been investigated.  
 Our results have implications for the discussion about the long run effects of free 
school choice that currently takes place in the US, UK and many other countries. Some 
schools in the Netherlands seem to have specialized on particular socio-economic subgroups 
with specific norms and values. From a school perspective, specialization might be a rational 
response when being faced with more transparency about school quality and increased 
competition for students. Policies aiming to increase school competition may be the tide that 
lifts all boats, but they might also foster school specialization in the long run. The case of the 
Netherlands shows that specialized schools are able to offer something valuable to parents, 
that is different from traditionally measured academic quality. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Distribution of school aggregated achievement test score averages 
  
Notes: These are school level averages of national-wide end of primary education achievement tests (CITO 
scores). The student specific achievement test score ranges between 500 and 550. The vertical lines mark the 
recommended thresholds for secondary school admission.  N(schools) =  183.  
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Figure 2: Distance to the chosen school in kilometers 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the variable “Distance to school”. 131 students attend schools farther 
than 5 kilometers away. N = 15,435. 
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Figure 3: Probability of choice and distance 
 
Notes: Development of distance dummies (in 100m steps) from conditional logit estimation and their 95% 
confidence intervals. Estimations based on 15,304 students from 192 schools. The reference category are school 
options within 0 - 100 meters distance from home.  
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Figure 4: Choice probability and student attainments (CITO) 
 
Notes: The radius of the circle represents the size of school dummy standard error. The slope of the line is 
significantly positive (P>|t| = 0.023). The figure is based on 183 schools. Nine schools were dropped from the 
sample due to a missing achievement test (CITO) score. 
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Figure 5: Do different SES subgroups find the same schools attractive?   
 
Figure 5a: Correlation of school preferences between higher and middle educated parents    
 
Note: The figure shows how school fixed effects obtained from conditional logit estimation correlate between 
different educational subgroups. The Y-axis represents the size of school fixed effects for higher educated 
parents and X-axis displays the fixed effects for middle educated. The slope of the fitted values line is .932 and 
statistically different from zero at the p<0.01 level. The slope of the line is not statistically different from one 
which means that we cannot reject that middle and higher educated have the same revealed preferences for 
schools. 
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Figure 5b: Correlation of school preferences between higher and lower educated parents    
 
Note: The figure shows how school fixed effects obtained from conditional logit estimation correlate between 
different educational subgroups. The Y-axis represents the size of school fixed effects for higher educated 
parents and X-axis displays the fixed effects for middle educated. The slope of the fitted values line is .420 and 
statistically different from zero at the p<0.01 level. The slope of the line is statistically different from one at the 
p<0.01 level..  
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Figure 5c: Correlation of school preferences between middle and lower educated parents    
 
Note: The figure shows how school fixed effects obtained from conditional logit estimation correlate between 
different educational subgroups. The Y-axis represents the size of school fixed effects for higher educated 
parents and X-axis displays the fixed effects for middle educated. The slope of the fitted values line is .361 and 
statistically different from zero at the p<0.01 level. The slope of the line is statistically different from one at the 
p<0.01 level. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of school Public Catholic Protestant Islamic Alternative All schools 
             
 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Percentage of parents lower educated 0.30 0.15 0.27 0.16 0.33 0.22 0.59 - 0.23 0.14 0.16 0.00 
Percentage of parents middle 
educated 0.30 0.09 0.37 0.11 0.32 0.16 0.20 - 0.35 0.13 0.35 0.11 
Percentage of parents higher educated 0.40 0.16 0.37 0.16 0.34 0.17 0.22 - 0.41 0.21 0.37 0.16 
Percentage with “weak”' Inspectorate 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28 0.11 0.33 0.00 - 0.14 0.36 0.09 0.29 
   evaluation             
Std. school average CITO 0.02 0.76 0.08 0.97 -0.12 1.05 2.93 - -0.68 0.95 0.03 0.98 
             Student distance in kilometers 0.993 1.13 0.713 0.77 0.854 0.98 2.628 3.10 1.457 1.87 0.83 1.01 
Distance rank of the school 3.438 4.56 2.094 3.21 3.475 4.64 11.16 11.02 5.781 7.07 2.66 4.15 
             Number of schools 31 145 9 1 14 200 
Average number of students 264.2 193.7 56.6 102.0 71.9 189.5 
Notes: The school type “Alternative” refers to schools with a particular teaching concept. Schools in this 
category are Montessori, Jenaplan and “vrije” schools. 
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Table 2: Number of schools in the neighborhood 
Distance radius from home  Number of schools 
 
Mean SD Min Max 
500 meters 0.84 0.76 0 4 
1 km  2.24 1.39 0 9 
2 km 6.23 3.69 0 17 
3 km 11.66 5.90 0 27 
4 km 17.74 7.86 0 34 
5 km 24.62 9.52 0 40 
     Number of observations 15435       
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Table 3: Preferences for school distance and quality - Estimates from conditional logit models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   
 
Conditional 
logit 
Conditional 
logit 
Conditional 
logit 
Conditional 
logit 
             
Distance to school (100m) -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.211*** 
 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
 ‘Weak’ Inspectorate evaluation 
 
-0.401** 
 
-0.283* 
 
  
(0.157) 
 
(0.165) 
 Std. CITO score 
  
0.144*** 0.127*** 
 
   
(0.047) (0.049) 
 
      Observations 554,855 554,855 554,855 554,855 
 Number of schools 183 183 183 183 
 Number of students 15000 15000 15000 15000   
Notes: The variable “std. CITO score” represents the standardized three year CITO score average from 2008, 
2009 and 2010 at the school level. The variable "weak" Inspectorate assessment includes the one school that was 
rated as “unsatisfactory”. The displayed coefficients represent the raw coefficients. Standard errors clustered at 
the school level are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Preferences for school distance and quality - Estimates from mixed logit models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Mixed 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
Mixed 
logit 
     
Means 
      Distance to school (100m) -0.308*** -0.309*** -0.312*** -0.313*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
  'Weak' evaluation 
 
-0.497*** 
 
-0.336*** 
  
(0.049) 
 
(0.050) 
  Std. CITO score 
  
0.190*** 0.169*** 
   
(0.012) (0.012) 
Standard deviations 
      SD distance to school (100m) 0.131*** 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  SD 'weak' evaluation 
 
0.038 
 
0.033 
  
(0.043) 
 
(0.044) 
  SD std. CITO score 
  
-0.013 0.030 
   
(0.030) (0.032) 
     Observations 554,855 554,855 554,855 554,855 
Number of schools 183 183 183 183 
Number of students 15000 15000 15000 15000 
Notes: The variable “Std. CITO score” represents the standardized three year CITO score average from 2008, 
2009 and 2010 at the school level. The variable "weak" Inspectorate assessment includes the one school that was 
rated as “unsatisfactory”. For the estimations we use simulated maximum likelihood and specify the mixing 
distribution of all random variables to be normally distributed. The displayed coefficients represent the raw 
coefficients.  Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 5: Heterogeneous preferences for school quality - Estimates from conditional logit models 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Higher 
educated 
Middle 
educated 
Lower 
educated 
        
Distance to school (100m) -0.216*** -0.226*** -0.212*** 
 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
Std. CITO score 0.256*** 0.086 0.084 
 
(0.085) (0.061) (0.061) 
'Weak' Inspectorate evaluation -0.811*** -0.448** -0.269 
 
(0.294) (0.227) (0.205) 
    Observations 136,460 124,750 88,735 
Number of schools 183 183 183 
Number of students 3687 3365 2399 
Notes: The variable “std. CITO score” represents the standardized three year CITO score average from 2008, 
2009 and 2010 at the school level. The variable "weak" Inspectorate assessment includes the one school that was 
rated as “unsatisfactory”. The displayed coefficients represent the raw coefficients.  Standard errors clustered at 
the school level are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Heterogeneous preferences for school quality - Estimates from mixed logit models 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Higher 
educated 
Middle 
educated 
Lower 
educated 
        
Means 
     Distance to school (100m) -0.294*** -0.347*** -0.324*** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011) 
  Std. CITO score 0.287*** 0.121*** 0.144*** 
 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.033) 
  'Weak' Inspectorate evaluation -1.037*** -0.517*** -0.316** 
 
(0.228) (0.115) (0.125) 
Standard deviations 
     SD Distance to school (100m) 0.112*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
  SD 'weak' evaluation -0.015 0.018 -0.300*** 
 
(0.073) (0.066) (0.090) 
  SD std. CITO score -0.723 0.091 0.130 
 
(0.462) (0.445) (0.365) 
    Observations 136,460 124,750 88,735 
Number of schools 183 183 183 
Number of students 3687 3365 2399 
Notes: The variable “Std. CITO score” represents the standardized three year CITO score average from 2008, 
2009 and 2010 at the school level. The variable "weak" Inspectorate assessment includes the one school that was 
rated as “unsatisfactory”. For the estimations we use simulated maximum likelihood and specify the mixing 
distribution of all random variables to be normally distributed. The displayed coefficients represent the raw 
coefficients.  Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 7: Heterogeneous preferences for school quality - Estimates from mixed logit models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
All Higher educated 
Middle 
educated 
Lower 
educated 
     
Mean 
      Distance to school (100m) -0.337*** -0.325*** -0.375*** -0.336*** 
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) 
  Std. CITO score 0.253*** 0.411*** 0.154*** 0.146*** 
 
(0.021) (0.038) (0.036) (0.030) 
 'Weak' Inspectorate evaluation -0.458*** -1.057*** -0.389*** -0.311** 
 
(0.085) (0.306) (0.143) (0.124) 
 Public school -0.135** -0.013 -0.460*** 0.107 
 
(0.062) (0.095) (0.116) (0.106) 
  Protestant school -0.731*** -1.053** -0.973* -0.628*** 
 
(0.201) (0.508) (0.527) (0.141) 
 Islamic school -16.955*** -7.950** -26.946* -39.870*** 
 
(5.002) (3.323) (15.459) (8.118) 
 Alternative teaching philosophy -0.262** -1.056*** -0.260 -0.473 
 
(0.126) (0.351) (0.174) (0.395) 
Standard deviations 
      SD Distance to school (100m) 0.141*** 0.130*** 0.162*** 0.149*** 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.016) 
 SD std. CITO score -0.076 -0.010 0.029 -0.311 
 
(0.050) (0.211) (0.042) (0.205) 
 SD 'Weak' Inspectorate evaluation -0.238 -0.920* 0.130 0.072 
 
(0.145) (0.520) (1.557) (0.163) 
  SD Public school -1.632*** 1.872*** 1.906*** -1.079 
 
(0.198) (0.281) (0.309) (0.770) 
 SD Protestant school 0.520 -1.023 1.194 -0.097 
 
(0.501) (0.643) (0.905) (0.346) 
 SD Islamic school -13.236*** -5.438** 19.227* -30.904*** 
 
(3.869) (2.555) (10.288) (5.523) 
  SD Alternative teaching philosophy 0.237 2.095*** 0.073 0.426 
 
(0.452) (0.432) (0.342) (0.439) 
     Observations 349,945 136,460 124,750 88,735 
Number of schools 183 183 183 183 
Number of students 9451 3687 3365 2399 
Notes: The variable “Std. CITO score” represents the standardized three year CITO score average from 2008, 
2009 and 2010 at the school level. The variable "weak" Inspectorate assessment includes the one school that was 
rated as “unsatisfactory”. For the estimations we use simulated maximum likelihood and specify the mixing 
distribution of all random variables to be normally distributed. The displayed coefficients represent the raw 
coefficients.  Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 8: Preferences for school types by religion of parents’ - Estimates from mixed logit models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Non-religious Catholic Islamic Others 
    
 Mean 
      Distance to school (100m) -0.352*** -0.358*** -0.363*** -0.305*** 
 
(0.020) (0.010) (0.044) (0.016) 
  Std. CITO score 0.363*** 0.202*** 0.190 0.301*** 
 
(0.056) (0.026) (0.131) (0.051) 
  'Weak' Inspectorate evaluation -0.782** -0.584*** -0.174 -0.081 
 
(0.333) (0.101) (0.345) (0.195) 
  Public school 1.063*** -0.599*** 0.395 0.301** 
 
(0.147) (0.101) (0.285) (0.121) 
  Protestant school -1.095 -1.241*** -0.648 0.334 
 
(0.693) (0.184) (0.652) (0.266) 
  Islamic school -21.887*** -23.072*** 5.239** -11.459** 
 
(0.686) (0.271) (2.304) (5.478) 
  Alternative teaching philosophy -0.467* -0.409*** -0.514 -0.264 
 
(0.280) (0.158) (0.927) (0.336) 
Standard deviations 
      SD Distance to school (100m) 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.147*** 0.133*** 
 
(0.014) (0.006) (0.026) (0.011) 
  SD std. CITO score 0.219 0.040 -0.267 -0.339** 
 
(0.179) (0.050) (0.468) (0.164) 
  SD 'Weak' Inspectorate evaluation 0.965 0.191 -0.033 -0.322 
 
(0.595) (0.126) (0.150) (0.646) 
  SD Public school -1.964*** 1.308*** -0.965 1.806*** 
 
(0.344) (0.338) (0.923) (0.365) 
  SD Protestant school -1.217 -0.019 0.262 0.158 
 
(0.854) (0.426) (0.920) (3.634) 
  SD Islamic school 0.097 0.048* 16.184*** -7.747*** 
 
(0.076) (0.026) (3.560) (2.720) 
  SD Alternative teaching philosophy -1.122*** 0.582 0.766 0.854 
 
(0.411) (0.367) (2.287) (0.740) 
     Observations 55,661 223,757 10,869 59,658 
Number of schools 183 183 183 183 
Number of students 1510 6028 295 1618 
Notes: The variable “Std. CITO score” represents the standardized three year CITO score average from 2008, 
2009 and 2010 at the school level. The variable "weak" Inspectorate assessment includes the one school that was 
rated as “unsatisfactory”. For the estimations we use simulated maximum likelihood and specify the mixing 
distribution of all random variables to be normally distributed. The displayed coefficients represent the raw 
coefficients. Standard errors clustered at the school level are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table A1: School level predictors of survey response – Probit regression 
  (1) 
 
Response 
    
Distance to school (100m) -0.003** 
 
(0.001) 
Std. CITO score 0.056*** 
 
(0.012) 
‘Weak' inspectorate evaluation -0.133*** 
 
(0.046) 
Catholic school reference 
  Public school -0.133*** 
 
(0.029) 
Protestant school -0.381*** 
 
(0.073) 
Islamic school -0.668*** 
 
(0.131) 
Alternative teaching philosophy 0.070 
 
(0.050) 
Constant 0.454*** 
 
(0.015) 
  Observations 15,000 
Number of schools 183 
Notes: The variable “Std. CITO score” represents the standardized three year CITO score average from 2008, 
2009 and 2010 at the school level. The variable “‘weak’ Inspectorate assessment” includes the one school that 
was rated as “unsatisfactory”. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2: Differences between the full and the questionnaire sample 
Sample: Full Questionnaire Full Questionnaire 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Conditional 
logit 
Conditional 
logit 
Mixed logit Mixed logit 
      
 
  
Distance to school (100m) -0.211*** -0.218*** -0.313*** -0.315*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.005) (0.006) 
'Weak' inspectorate evaluation -0.283* -0.429** -0.336*** -0.479*** 
 
(0.165) (0.207) (0.050) (0.080) 
Std. CITO score 0.127*** 0.150*** 0.169*** 0.190*** 
 
(0.049) (0.058) (0.012) (0.016) 
     Standard deviations 
      Distance to school (100m) 
  
0.134*** 0.130*** 
   
(0.003) (0.004) 
  Std. SAT score 
  
0.033 0.082 
   
(0.044) (0.086) 
  'Weak' inspection  valuation 
  
0.030 -0.012 
   
(0.032) (0.020) 
     Observations 554,855 362,019 554,855 362,019 
Number of schools 183 183 183 183 
Number of students 15000 9779 15000 9779 
Notes: The variable “Std. CITO score” represents the standardized three year CITO score average from 2008, 
2009 and 2010 at the school level. The variable “Weak Inspectorate assessment” includes the one school that 
was rated as “unsatisfactory”. For the estimations we specify the mixing distribution of all random variables to 
be normally distributed. The displayed coefficients represent the raw coefficients. Standard errors clustered at 
the school level are reported in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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